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Abstract
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1 Introduction
Since the seminal work of Merz (1995) and Andolfatto (1996), dynamic stochastic general
equilibrium (DSGE) models with labor market search frictions have been widely used to
study unemployment fluctuations. However, these two approaches place different restrictions
on individual choices. In turn, Merz (1995) assumes the existence of a representative “large
family”, constrained by budget sets and an employment law of motion, while Andolfatto (1996)
assumes a game of “musical chairs” (exogenous shocks), that randomly allocate individuals
to labor market states, with perfect insurance against idiosyncratic risk.1 We take our cue
from the latter approach and make the following contribution: we generalise the musical
chairs’ approach to a model with gross worker flows and individual participation choices,
using results from the literature on sunspots and lotteries, along the lines of Kehoe et al.
(2002). To the best of our knowledge, ours is the first paper to offer an aggregation result
in economies with three-state labor markets based on individual choices (without having to
impose the assumption of the “large family”).
Our approach yields a tractable characterization of equilibrium in economies combining
indivisible labor supply choices (participation margin), and labor market frictions. The
literature has often restricted attention to two-state labor markets, ignoring participation and
focusing on the margin between employment and unemployment.2 However, recent empirical
work attributes an important role to the participation margin for labor market transitions.
Elsby et al. (2015) showed that the participation margin accounts for one-third of the cyclical
variation in the unemployment rate. Moreover, unlike the Merz (1995) large family set-up,
which only identifies net worker flows, our model yields a characterization of equilibrium
1Also, Merz (1997) used a randomisation device analogous to Andolfatto to decentralise the constrained
optimum in a two-state labor market.
2Several papers consider participation in DSGE models with search frictions. Some early examples
are Veracierto (2008), Ravn (2008) and Shimer (2013). This notwithstanding, the inclusion of an intertemporal
labor supply margin in economies with indivisibilities and search frictions remains a difficult task. All examples
above use the Merz (1995) “large family” model to achieve aggregation, and deliver stark counterfactual
predictions about the labor market (for example, procyclical unemployment).
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gross worker flows. This is important, since Krusell et al. (2011) and Krusell et al. (2017)
stressed the importance of gross worker flows and developed models with missing insurance
markets and indivisibilities in labor supply choice to account for these transitions.
We develop a general equilibrium model of gross worker flows with complete markets,
where individuals face heterogeneous employment histories and idiosyncratic risk. Following
Andolfatto (1996), musical chairs allocate individuals to different labor market states each
period; conditional on this, individuals face an indivisible participation choice, in labor market
with search frictions. To overcome indivisibilities, individuals play lotteries over participation
as in Rogerson (1988) and Hansen (1985). The decision of each individual is based on the joint
outcome of public (“musical chairs”) and contrived randomness (lotteries) and the realisation
of idiosyncratic shocks. This hybrid decision process may seem unusual, but we argue it can
be microfounded as follows. We demonstrate that one can mimic the joint effects of musical
chairs and lotteries by indexing on the basis of two naturally occurring random variables
(sunspots) prior and after the realisation of the idiosyncratic shocks. Such an arrangement is
consistent with the existence of the usual Arrow-Debreu contingent commodities.
Subsequently, similarly to Christiano et al. (2020) we use comparative steady state analysis
as a short-cut for analyzing model dynamics. Two main insights emerge from this analysis.
First, our model reconciles the neoclassical growth model with search frictions with a mildly
procyclical participation rate. This result is particularly important given the tendency for
models featuring intertemporal substitution in frictional labor markets to deliver excessively
procyclical participation and, thus, procyclical unemployment (a problem stressed by Ravn,
2008; Shimer, 2013, for example).
Second, despite its parsimony, we show using a calibrated example that the model can account
well for the observed flows. In particular, it is able to match the high transition rate from
unemployment to inactivity, which early papers by Garibaldi and Wasmer (2005) and Krusell
et al. (2011) have shown to be challenging for equilibrium models of gross worker flows, under
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either complete or incomplete markets.
The literature on sunspots and lotteries in economies with non-convexities and complete
markets includes, among others, Prescott and Townsend (1984), Kehoe et al. (2002), Shell
and Wright (1993), Garratt (1995), and Garratt et al. (2004). Our results generalise models
with indivisibilities to include idiosyncratic risk arising from frictional labor markets. To
achieve that, we introduce the distinction between public randomisations prior and after
the realisation of idiosyncratic shocks in each period—although this distinction is already
discussed by Kehoe et al. (2002), it is not important for their analysis.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 explains the environment; Section 3 establishes
that an equilibrium with musical chairs and lotteries corresponds to a sunspot equilibrium;
Section 4 presents the comparative steady state analysis ; Section 5 concludes.
2 Model
2.1 Agents and markets
Time is discrete, indexed t = 0, 1, . . . The economy is populated by a continuum of infinitely-
lived individuals, i ∈ [0, 1]. There is a single good, produced with capital and labor. Individuals
buy consumption, c and invest in capital, k, depreciating at rate δ ∈ (0, 1), and face an
indivisible participation choice: labor market participation imposes a utility loss, ξ ≥ 0.
Conditional on participation, individuals may be employed or unemployed. If employed,
they incur an additional utility cost − ln
(
1 − h
)
> 0, as they sacrifice h ∈ (0, 1) units of their
endowment of time. Workers transition between three states: employment (e), unemployment
(u), and non-participation (o). We denote labor market states by ı ∈ L ≡ {e, u, o}. Individuals
have flow utility, U (c) − ψ (ı), with U′ (c) > 0 and U′′ (c) < 0, and with ψ(e) ≡ ξ − ln
(
1 − h
)
,
ψ(u) ≡ ξ and ψ(o) ≡ 0.
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Competitive firms have (identical) constant returns to scale technology which turns labor
and capital into output, F (k, n), that satisfy standard Inada conditions and (k, n) denote
the demand for capital and labor. Firms pay wages w to hire workers, r to rent capital, and
maximize profits, F (k, n) − wn − rk.
The economy consists of three islands, which we refer to as employment island, unemployment
island and leisure island. Individuals that were unemployed (non-participants) in the previous
period, start at the beginning of date t in the unemployment (leisure) island. If they decide not
to participate, they relocate (remain) to the leisure island; and, if they decide to participate,
they relocate to the employment island with probability f , or they remain (relocate) to
the unemployment island with probability 1 − f . Moreover, new jobs become immediately
productive.
Individuals previously employed, start date t in the employment island. An existing job is
destroyed with probability λ, and upon destruction, previously employed individuals are
allowed to search for another job and remain to the employment island with probability
f . With probability 1 − λ the job is not destroyed and they continue with the existing
employment relationship.
Labor frictions restrict access to the employment island; however, conditional on access, the
labor market is competitive and wages reflect the marginal product of labor.3 Goods markets
are competitive, with capital moving freely across islands. There is no aggregate uncertainty,
but frictional labor markets generate idiosyncratic risk.
2.2 Institutions
We consider two institutional trading arrangements. In the first, as in Andolfatto (1996), at
the start of date t a game of musical chairs allocates individuals to different labor market
3This assumption follows Lucas and Prescott (1974) and Krusell et al. (2011).
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states ı ∈ L. Subsequently, individuals buy lotteries over labor force participation and
idiosyncratic shocks realise. Each period, insurance markets open before the realization of
musical chairs and lotteries, with contracts traded at actuarially fair prices. At the end
of each date, spots market open where individuals receive income, execute contracts, buy
consumption and invest.
In the second market structure (the sunspot economy), we assume markets open only once, at
date −1. Individuals trade contracts contingent on “sunspot” activity and idiosyncratic risk.
Sunspots act as a coordination device much like the musical chairs and affect welfare because
of indivisibilities in labor supply choices. This structure yields a competitive equilibrium
with voluntary trade in contingent commodities, where sunspots coordinate actions among
individuals. We label the first model “musical chairs” and the second “sunspots”, and we
study each in turn.
2.2.1 Musical chairs
At the beginning of date t a game of musical chairs assigns individuals to a labor market
state ı ∈ L ∈ {e, u, o}, with probability αt (ı). Figures 1a and 1b show the sequence of events
conditional on the musical chairs randomisation. Specifically, individuals assigned to the
employment island (ı = e) observe the realisation of the idiosyncratic shock κ ∈ {ed, end },
where κ = ed denotes destruction (d) with probability λ, and κ = end denotes no destruction
(nd) with 1− λ; subsequently they buy lotteries over labor force participation, and conditional
on the lottery outcome engage (or not) in search activity. Individuals assigned to the
unemployment or leisure island (ı ∈ {u, o}) buy lotteries over labor force participation and
then engage (or not) in search activity. We denote by ı˜ ∈ {ed, end, u, o} the consolidated set of
states prior to the participation lottery stage, by  ∈ L ∈ {e, u, o} the labor market state at
the end of the period and by pi (˜ı) the lottery over labor force participation. The pair (˜ı, )
denotes the labor market transitions of individuals during each period. Individuals discount
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ı = e
(κ = end)
(o)
1 − pi(end )
(e)
pi(end
)
1 − λ
(κ = ed)
(o)
1 − pi(ed )
(u)
1 − f
(e)f
pi(ed)
λ
(a) Sequence of events conditional on ı = e
ı ∈ {u, o}
(o)
1 − pi(ı)
(u)
1 − f
(e)f
pi(ı)
(b) Sequence of events conditional on ı ∈ {u, o}
Figure 1: Sequence of events conditional on musical chairs’ randomisation
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the future with β ∈ (0, 1) .
The Bellman equation characterising each individual’s decision is
Vt
(
kt, k¯t
)
= max
{c,k,y,pi}
{
αt (e) [(1 − λt )vt (end) + λtvt (ed)] + αt (u)vt (u) + α(o)vt (o)
}
with
vt (end) = pit (end)
[
U [ct (end, e)] − ψ(e) + βVt+1
(
kt+1 (end, e) , k¯t+1
)]
+
(1 − pit (end))
[
U [ct (end, o)] + βVt+1
(
kt+1 (end, o) , k¯t+1
)]
,
and, for ı˜ ∈ {ed, u, o},
vt (˜ı) = pit (˜ı) f t
(
U (ct (˜ı, e)) − ψ(e) + βVt+1
(
kt+1 (˜ı, e) , k¯t+1
))
+
pit (˜ı)(1 − f t )
(
U (ct (˜ı, u)) − ψ(u) + βVt+1
(
kt+1 (˜ı, u) , k¯t+1
))
+
(1 − pit (˜ı))
(
U (ct (˜ı, o)) + βVt+1
(
kt+1 (˜ı, o) , k¯t+1
))
,
subject to the budget constraint for each pair (˜ı, ),
ct
(˜
ı, 
)
+ kt+1
(˜
ı, 
)
+
∑
ı˜
∑
 qt
(˜
ı, 
)
yt
(˜
ı, 
)
= yt
(˜
ı, 
)
+ (rt + 1 − δ) kt + wth1 ,
where 1  is an indicator function that is equal to unity if  = e and zero otherwise. The
relevant state space for individual optimisation consists of predetermined individual and
aggregate capital stock, k and k¯, respectively, and is independent of the previous period
individual labor market state. At the end of date t, individuals buy consumption ct
(˜
ı, 
)
,
invest in capital stock kt+1
(˜
ı, 
)
, execute contracts yt
(˜
ı, 
)
that are purchased at the beginning
of date t (ex-ante) at price qt
(˜
ı, 
)
, receive capital income and, if employed, labor income.
Actuarially fair insurance implies that marginal utilities of consumption Uc [c
(˜
ı, 
)
] are
equalised across all labor market states, which implies that c
(˜
ı, 
)
= c for all pairs (˜ı, ).
In turn, it follows that the marginal return of one additional unit of captial Vk
(
k
(˜
ı, 
)
, k¯
)
is equalised across labor market states, which implies k
(˜
ı, 
)
= k for all pairs (˜ı, ). The
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individual’s decision is consolidated as follows:
Vt
(
kt, k¯t
)
= max
{
U (ct ) − αt (e)(1 − λt )pit (end)
(
ξ − ln
(
1 − h
))
−(
ξ − f t ln
(
1 − h
))
[αt (e)λtpit (ed) + αt (u)pit (u) + α(o)pit (o)] + βVt+1
(
kt+1, k¯t+1
) } (1)
subject to
ct + kt+1 =[
αt (e)pit (end)(1 − λt ) +
(
αt (e)λtpit (ed) + αt (u)pit (u) + α(o)pit (o)
)
f t
]
wth + (rt + 1 − δ)kt,
0 ≤ pit (˜ı) ≤ 1.
(2)
This represents the decision of a stand-in agent who chooses consumption, investment and
lotteries over participation to maximise (1) subject to (2).
Wages and rental prices earn their respective marginal products. Insurance markets are
segmented, in the sense that there exist separate markets for each contingency (˜ı, ). Insurers
in each market offer contracts y (˜ı, ) at actuarially fair prices q (˜ı, ), and free entry drives
profits to zero.
Equilibrium is defined as follows:
Definition 1 (Musical chairs) A full insurance equilibrium is a price system {w, r, q} and
probaility measures α(ı) for ı ∈ L, a law of motion for aggregate capital k¯, a collection of
individual choices {c, k, pi, y}, an individual value function V
(
k, k¯
)
and a collection of firm
choices {k, n} such that:
1. At given prices and α(ı), {c, k, pi, y} and V
(
k, k¯
)
solve the individual’s problem;
2. At given prices, all firms maximise profits;
3. Good’s market clears, c + k+1 = f (k, n) + (1 − δ)k;
4. Capital market clears, k = k¯;
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5. Labor market clears,
n =
[
α(e)pi(end)(1 − λ) +
(
α(e)λpi(ed) + α(u)pi(u) + α(o)pi(o)
)
f
]
h;
6. α(ı) is equal to the previous period measure of individuals in labor market state ı.
The following remarks are in order. First, we show that any interior equilibrium satisfies
pi(end) = 1 (corner solution) and pi (˜ı) ∈ (0, 1), ı˜ ∈ {ed, u, o} (see Appendix A for details).
Second, probabilities α(ı) are determined by the measures of individuals in state ı ∈ {e, u, o}
at the end of the previous period. Hence, although α(ı) are taken as given by individuals,
they are determined endogenously in equilibrium. Third, in Section 4 we offer a detailed
characterisation of the equilibrium and discuss various comparative static exercises.
The hybrid model that we have analysed so far includes the musical chairs’ framework
of Andolfatto (1996) as a special case.
Lemma 1 If ξ = 0, then our framework reduces to the musical chairs’ model of Andolfatto
(1996).
Proof. Suppose ξ = 0. Set
Nt = αt (e)pit (end)(1 − λt ) +
(
αt (e)λtpit (ed) + αt (u)pit (u) + α(o)pit (o)
)
f t,
with N ≡ n/h (see Section 4 for full details).
Then, (1)–(2), reduce to:
Vt
(
kt, k¯t
)
= max
{c,k}
{
U (ct ) + Nt ln
(
1 − h
)
+ βVt+1
(
kt+1, k¯t+1
) }
, (3)
subject to
ct + kt+1 = wtNth + (rt + 1 − δ)kt . (4)
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This corresponds to Andolfatto’s model with Nt denoting the probability that an individual
is allocated to employment and 1− Nt the probability that is allocated to nonemployment.
This result requires that if the opportunity cost of participation is negligible, ξ = 0, then the
randomisation devices prior and after the realisation of idiosyncratic shocks (see figures 1a
nd 1b) reduce to the simple musical chair’s randomisation in Andolfatto (1996).
2.2.2 Sunspots
In this Section we abstract from sequential trading and assume Arrow-Debreu (AD) markets,
with trade occurring at date −1. Individuals trade contracts contingent on the publicly
observed sunspot activity and idiosyncratic risk. Sunspot activity is constructed so that each
period it induces a distribution of individuals across labor market states (islands) L = {e, o, s}.
We employ the distinction between ex-ante and ex-post public randomisations (sunspots)
within a given period that is discussed in Kehoe et al. (2002).4 Figure 2 shows the sequence
of events at date t. We denote ex-ante sunspot shocks with a superscript “0”, and ex-post
shocks with a superscript “1”. At the beginning of date t individuals observe the ex-ante
sunspot shock s0t , subsequently the idiosyncratic shock is realised and at the end of the period
the ex-post sunspot shock s1t is realised and transactions take place. For example, individuals
induced by the ex-ante sunspot to start date t in the employment island, observe if the job is
destroyed or not and the ex-post sunspot realisation allocates them to a labor market state
at the end of the period; similarly, individuals induced by the ex-ante sunspot to start date t
in the unemployment island, find employment with probability f and remain unemployed
with probability 1 − f , and at the end of the period observe the realisation of the ex-post
4In their framework, only ex-post randomisations are important to overcome non-convexities arising from
private information; and in fact, they show that the model with ex-ante and ex-post sunspots is equivalent
in terms of allocations to the model with only ex-post sunspots. However, Cole (1989) showed that in a
set-up with ex-ante sunspots and convex set of feasible allocations, the introduction of ex-post sunspots is
still welfare improving because lotteries conditional on private information separate individuals with different
risk profiles.
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ex-ante sunspot s0t idiosyncratic shock ex-post sunspot s
1
t
Figure 2: Sequence of events at date t
sunspot and execute all their obligations.
The distinction between ex-ante and ex-post sunspots is important and serves the following
purpose. Ex-ante public randomisations replicate the distribution of musical chairs, allow us
to overcome non-convexities arising from indivisibilities in labor supply and influence the
distribution of idiosyncratic risk (see below); while ex-post randomisation allow us to separate
those individuals whose pre-existing jobs have been destroyed and need to be assigned into a
labor market state, from those individuals whose jobs have survived (see Figure 1a). Hence, in
the absence of idiosyncratic risk arising from job destruction, the ex-post public randomisation
device is irrelevant.
Time and the resolution of uncertainty are described by an event-tree, a countable set.
Denote the history of ex-ante and ex-post sunspot realisations up and until date t by s0t =[
s00, s
0
1, ...., s
0
t
]
, s1t =
[
s10, s
1
1, ...., s
1
t
]
, the joint history by st =
[
(s00, s
1
0), (s
0
1, s
1
1), ....., (s
0
t , s
1
t )
]
and
the history of idiosyncratic shocks up and until date t by φt = [φ0, φ1, ..., φt ]. Let σt be
the date-event consisting of ex-ante and ex-post sunspot realisations, st, and idiosyncratic
shocks, φt, with history up to and including date t, σt = [σ1, σ2, .., σt ]. We require the
probability distribution of ex-post shocks to have a continuous density. We assume that s1t
is distributed uniformly on [0, 1] and let µ1t
(
s0t, φt, s1t−1
)
be the measure of date t ex-post
sunspots states conditional on history
{
s0t, φt, s1t−1
}
. The probability distributions of ex-ante
and idiosyncratic shocks are obtained by appropriate construction as we demonstrate below.
Let the unconditional probability of s0t be µ0t
(
s0t
)
and the probability of φt conditional on
s0t be γt
(
φt |s0t
)
. Let µt
(
s0t, φt
)
= γt
(
φt |s0t
)
µ0t
(
s0t
)
. We assume that histories of ex-post
shocks do not influence the distributions of ex-ante and idiosyncratic shocks.5 Individuals
5This assumption follows Prescott and Townsend (1984), who assume that histories of lottery outcomes
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trade contingent claims against future events σt at price pt
(
σt
)
and firms buy inputs and
sell output against st at pt
(
st
)
. Prices pt
(
st
)
are derived from pt
(
σt
)
by summing over φt .
The decision of an individual is
max
c,k
∑
t
βt
∑
{s0t,φt }
µt
(
s0t, φt
) ∫
s1t
[
U
(
ct
(
σt
))
− ψ
(
σt
) ]
ds1t, (5)
subject to
∑
t
∑
{s0t,φt }
∫
s1t pt
(
σt
) [
ct
(
σt
)
+ kt+1
(
σt
) ]
ds1t
=∑
t
∑
{s0t,φt }
∫
s1t pt
(
σt
) [(
rt
(
st
)
+ 1 − δ) kt (σt−1) + hwt (st ) 1 (σt )] ds1t,
(6)
where the indicator function 1
(
σt
)
is equal to unity at date-events where individuals work
and zero otherwise. We define multiple integrals
∫
s1t ≡
∫
s10
· · · ∫ s1t up to and including date t
and differentials ds1t ≡ ds1t · · · ds10 back to date zero.
Firms choose capital and labor to maximise profits:
maxk,n
∑
t
∑
s0t
∫
s1t pt
(
st
) [
F
(
kt
(
st−1
)
, nt
(
st
)) − rt (st ) kt (st−1) − w (st ) nt (st ) ]ds1t . (7)
Consider the following definition of a sunspot equilibrium.
Definition 2 (Sunspots) A sunspot equilibrium is a price system {w, r, p}, a collection of
individual choices {c, k}, and a collection of firm choices {k, n} such that:
1. At given prices, {c, k} solve the individual’s problem (5)-(6);
2. At given prices, firms maximise profits (7);
do not influence the distribution of types across the population.
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3. Good’s market clears,
∫ (
ct
(
σt
)
+ kt+1
(
σt
)
− (1 − δ)kt
(
σt−1
))
di = f
(
kt
(
st−1
)
, nt
(
st
))
;
4. Capital market clears,
∫
kt
(
σt
)
di = k
(
st
)
;
5. Labor market clears, nt
(
st
)
=
∫
h1
(
σt
)
di.
3 Equivalence
The purpose of this Section is to demonstrate a partial equivalence result, that is, the
equilibrium allocation under the institutional trading arrangement of musical chairs and
lotteries corresponds to an equilibrium with sunspots. In turn, this equivalence microfounds
the hybrid model of musical chairs, idiosyncratic risk and lotteries over labor force participation.
Subsequently, we demonstrate that the sunspot allocation is constrained Pareto optimal,
taking as given the effect of idiosyncratic risk.
Proposition 1 An equilibrium with musical chairs and lotteries corresponds to a sunspot
equilibrium.
The proof is constructive. Suppose an equilibrium with musical chairs exists. Then, we
construct an equilibrium with sunspots supporting the same allocations as the musical chairs
equilibrium.
Consider the stand-in agent’s problem in the musical chairs economy, given by (1)–(2),
implying the first-order conditions
Uc (ct ) = βRt+1Uc (ct+1) , (8)
ξ − f t ln
(
1 − h
)
= f twthUc (ct ) , (9)
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ξ − ln
(
1 − h
)
< wthUc (ct ) , (10)
where Rt+1 ≡ rt+1 + 1 − δ. Condition (8) is the Euler equation and (9), (10) are optimality
conditions with respect to pi (˜ı) ∈ (0, 1), ı˜ ∈ {ed, u, o} and pi(end) = 1 (corner solution). Firm’s
optimality requires rt = Fk (k, n) and wt = Fn (k, n) . We denote the equilibrium allocation
under musical chairs with superscript “∗”.
Next, we construct a sunspot equilibrium where agent decisions are identical to those in the
musical chairs equilibrium. To that end, we set the wage rate and the return on capital in
the sunspot equilibrium to be equal to
(
R∗t ,w∗t
)
. Define AD prices as follows:
pt
(
σt
)
≡ µt
(
s0t, φt
)
× *,
t∏
τ=0
(
R∗τ
)−1+- , (11)
with R0 ≡ 1. Define the investment portfolio xt+1 as follows:
xt+1 ≡
∑
{s0t,φt }
µt
(
s0t, φt
) ∫
s1t
kt+1
(
σt
)
ds
1t
, (12)
The investment portfolio xt+1, and not its composition, is the relevant choice variable. In par-
ticular, individuals buy xt+1 at price
∏t
τ=0
(
R∗τ
)−1, and receive return [∏t+1τ=0 (R∗τ)−1] R∗t+1xt+1.
Individual optimality with respect to xt+1 is satisfied at prices given by (11). Moreover, (11)
implies that individual marginal utilities are equal across date-events, implying c
(
σt
)
= ct,
for all histories σt . Finally, under the given price system, the decisions of all the agents in the
economy are well defined since limt→∞
∑
t
(∏t
τ=0
(
R∗τ
)−1) converges (equivalently, the musical
chairs equilibrium is dynamically efficient).
Thus, problem (5)–(6) reduces to
max
∑
t
βt
*.,U (ct ) −
∑
{s0t,φt }
µt
(
s0t, φt
) ∫
s1t
ψ
(
σt
)
ds1t+/- , (13)
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subject to
∑
t
*,
t∏
τ=0
(
R∗τ
)−1+- (ct + xt+1) =
∑
t
*,
t∏
τ=0
(
R∗τ
)−1+- *.,R∗t xt + w∗t h
∑
{s0t,φt }
µt
(
s0t, φt
) ∫
s1t
1
(
σt
)
ds1t+/- .
(14)
Optimality with respect to consumption between two consecutive dates yields (8), so that
ct = c∗t is consistent with optimality. Moreover, we set xt+1 = k∗t+1. To complete the argument
we need to show that optimal allocations satisfy conditions (9)–(10) as well. From the
consolidated problem (13)-(14) we can observe that keeping track the histories of ex-post
realisations s1t−1 is not relevant anymore. To that end, we construct the conditional measure
of ex-post states µ1t
(
s0t, φt
)
—dropping histories s1t−1—and the probability measure µ0t
(
s0t
)
.
Let, in turn, S1
(
s0t
)
denote the set of individuals who, following history s0t , are allocated to
a pre-existing job that is destroyed with probability λ and survives with probability 1 − λ, as
if starting from the employment island; S2
(
s0t
)
the set of individuals who purchase lottery
profile yielding employment with probability f , and unemployed with probability 1 − f , as
if they started from the unemployment island; S3
(
s0t
)
the set of individuals who purchase
lottery profile yielding employment with probability f , and unemployed with probability
1− f , as if they started from the leisure island; and, S4
(
s0t
)
the set of individuals who choose
not to participate upon observing s0t .
Consider the following equilibrium conditions at history s0t :∫
i∈S1(s0t )
di = α∗t (e) ,∫
i∈S2(s0t )
di = α∗t (u) pi∗t (u) ,∫
i∈S3(s0t )
di = α∗t (o) pi∗t (o) ,
(15)
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and for each individual i ∑
s0t : i∈S1(s0t )
µt
(
s0t
)
= α∗t (e) ,
∑
s0t : i∈S2(s0t )
µt
(
s0t
)
= α∗t (u) pi∗t (u) ,
∑
s0t : i∈S3(s0t )
µt
(
s0t
)
= α∗t (o) pi∗t (o) ,
(16)
where the pair (α∗, pi∗) denotes the musical chairs’ and participation probability measures
evaluated at the musical chairs equilibrium. Conditions (15) are equilibrium conditions so
that the measure of individuals at history node s0t who face the prospect of job destruction
or purchase each lottery profile after the sunspot realisation, is equal to the corresponding
measure in the musical chairs equilibrium. Conditions (16) are consistency conditions so that
the measures across history nodes where each individual faces the prospect of job destruction
or purchases each lottery profile is equal to the measure of individuals at each history node
s0t who faces job destruction or purchase each lottery profile. Finally, construction of set
S4
(
s0t
)
follows residually.
Let, in turn, Q1
(
s1t |s0t, φt
)
denote the fraction of individuals, among the measure of individuals
who start from the employment island with a job that is destroyed following history {s0t, φt },
who end up being employed at s1t ; Q
2
(
s1t |s0t, φt
)
denote the fraction of individuals, among
the measure of individuals who start from the employment island with a pre-existing job that
is destroyed, who end up being unemployed; Q3
(
s1t |s0t, φt
)
denote the fraction of individuals,
among the measure of individuals who start from the employment island with a pre-existing
job that is destroyed, who end up out of the labor force; Q4
(
s1t |s0t, φt
)
the fraction of
individuals, among the measure of individuals who start from the employment island with a
job that is not destroyed, who end up employed; and Q5
(
s1t |s0t, φt
)
the fraction of individuals,
among the measure of individuals who start from the employment island with a job that is
not destroyed, who end up out of the labor force.
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Consider the following equilibrium conditions:∫
i∈Q1(s1t |s0t,φt )
di = pi∗t (ed) f t,
∫
i∈Q4(s1t |s0t,φt )
di = pi∗t (end)∫
i∈Q2(s1t |s0t,φt )
di = pi∗t (ed) (1 − f t ),
∫
i∈Q5(s1t |s0t,φt )
di = 1 − pi∗t (end)∫
i∈Q3(s1t |s0t,φt )
di = 1 − pi∗t (ed) ,
(17)
and for each individual i
µ1t
(
s0t, φt
)
= pi∗t (ed) f t, for each i ∈ Q1
(
s1t |s0t, φt
)
µ1t
(
s0t, φt
)
= pi∗t (ed) (1 − f t ), for each i ∈ Q2
(
s1t |s0t, φt
)
µ1t
(
s0t, φt
)
= 1 − pi∗t (ed) , for each i ∈ Q3
(
s1t |s0t, φt
)
µ1t
(
s0t, φt
)
= pi∗t (end) , for each i ∈ Q4
(
s1t |s0t, φt
)
µ1t
(
s0t, φt
)
= 1 − pi∗t (end) , for each i ∈ Q5
(
s1t |s0t, φt
)
(18)
where as before pi∗ denotes participation probability measures evaluated at the musical
chairs’ equilibrium. Conditions (17)- (18) are equilibrium and consistency conditions similar
to (15)- (16). Finally, for individuals not belonging to the set S1
(
s0t
)
, the realisation of
ex-post sunspots are irrelevant, so that the conditional measure of ex-post states is degenerate
and equal to µ1t
(
s0t, φt
)
= 1.
We require that idiosyncratic shocks and public signals are not independent events so that
γt
(
φt |s0t
)
depends on histories s0t . In particular, we construct a dependence structure
between shocks and signals consistent with summations over histories {s0t, φt } in (13)–(14)
yielding the problem
max
∑
t β
t
[
U (ct ) − α∗t (e)(1 − λt )pit (end)
(
ξ − ln
(
1 − h
))
−(
ξ − f t ln
(
1 − h
))
[α∗t (e)λtpit (ed) + α∗t (u)pit (u) + α∗t (o)pit (o)]
] (19)
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subject to
∑
t
(∏
t
(
R∗t
)−1) (ct + xt+1) = ∑t (∏t (R∗t )−1) R∗t xt+∑
t
(∏
t
(
R∗t
)−1) [α∗t (e)pit (end)(1 − λt ) + (α∗t (e)λtpit (ed) + α∗t (u)pit (u) + α∗t (o)pit (o)) f t]w∗t h.
(20)
Optimality with respect to consumption and probability measures pi satisfy (8)–(10). Thus,
ct = c∗t , xt+1 = k∗t+1, pit (ed) = pi
∗
t (ed), pit (end) = pi
∗
t (end), pit (u) = pi
∗
t (u), pit (o) = pi
∗
t (o) satisfy
optimality. Feasibility at the given prices follows by multiplying (2) with
∏t
τ=0
(
R∗τ
)−1, and
adding across time to obtain (20). Finally, this allocation is consistent with firm’s optimality
and market clearing conditions.
Proposition 1 has welfare implications. The sunspot allocation is Pareto efficient, given labor
market frictions, if there is no alternative feasible allocation in which almost all households
have no less utility and a positive measure of households have strictly more utility.
The following result applies.
Proposition 2 The sunspot equilibrium allocation is Pareto efficient.
Proposition 2 is a direct consequence of non-satiation of utility, and the first welfare theorem.
To see this, consider (13)–(14) and rewrite it as an AD equilibrium under certainty so that
the first welfare theorem applies. To this end, consider the following definitions:
ψt =
∑
{s0t,φt }
µt
(
s0t, φt
) ∫
s1t
ψ
(
σt
)
ds1t, ht = h
∑
{s0t,φt }
µt
(
s0t, φt
) ∫
s1t
1
(
σt
)
ds1t, pt =
t∏
τ=0
(
R∗τ
)−1 .
(21)
Problem (13)–(14) modify as follows
max
∑
t
βt [U (ct ) − ψt ], (22)
19
subject to ∑
t
pt (ct + xt+1) =
∑
t
pt
(
R∗t xt + w∗t ht
)
, (23)
where ψt denotes the time-varying disutility cost at date t; ht denote the time-varying
endowment of time at date t; and, pt denotes AD prices with
∑
t pt < ∞. This is equivalent to
the neoclassical growth model with time-varying endowments and preferences, so that the
first welfare theorem applies.
4 Steady state analysis
In this Section we restrict attention to the steady state of the model and discuss comparative
statics. We assume U (c) = ln(c) and F (k, n) = kαn1−α with 0 < α < 1. The system of
equilibrium conditions consists of two blocks. The first block includes conditions (8)–(10) and
market clearing conditions. The second block consists of motion equations for the aggregate
labor market variables, as follows
nt/h ≡ Nt = (1 − ut )Πt, (24)
Nt = pit (end)(1 − λt )Nt−1 + Ht f t, (25)
Πt = pit (end) (1 − λt ) Nt−1 + Ht, (26)
Ht = pit (u)Ut−1 + pit (o)Ot−1 + pit (ed)λtNt−1, (27)
where Nt , Ut and Ot , denote measures of individuals, in turn, in the employment island,
the unemployment island, and the leisure island (non-participants), at the end of date t;
Πt ≡ Ut + Nt , is the labor force measure, Ht denotes the measure of individuals searching for
jobs, and ut ≡ Ut/Πt is the unemployment rate.
20
The equilibrium is described by the following two systems of equations

c−1t = βRt+1c−1t+1,
ξ/ f t − ln
(
1 − h
)
= wthc−1t ,
ct + kt+1 = kαt
(
hNt
)1−α
+ (1 − δ)kt,
wt = (1 − α)
(
kt
hNt
)α
,
Rt+1 = 1 − δ + α
( hNt
kt
)α
,
(28)

Nt = (1 − ut )Πt,
Nt = (1 − λt )Nt−1 + Ht f t,
Πt = (1 − λt ) Nt−1 + Ht,
Ht = pit (u)Ut−1 + pit (o)Ot−1 + pit (ed)λtNt−1.
(29)
System (28) corresponds to the neoclassical growth model, with an endogenous labor market
wedge in the second equation of the system, given by
wth = labor wedge ×MRS
=

(
ξ/ f t
) − ln (1 − h)
− ln
(
1 − h
) 

− ln
(
1 − h
)
1/ct
 ,
(30)
where MRS = − ln
(
1 − h
)
ct , corresponds to the marginal rate of substitution between leisure
and consumption in the absence of an opportunity cost of participation. The labor wedge is
an outcome of search frictions, because the opportunity cost of participation is different from
zero.
It follows from system (29) that the composition of H is indeterminate (see Ljungqvist and
Sargent, 2008, for a related result). In the sunspot equilibrium, an equilibrium composition for
H is selected through sunspots. Specifically, any restriction on parameters [pi(u), pi(o), pi(ed)],
maps into a sunspot equilibrium via conditions (16) and (18).
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Next, we focus on the steady state of (28) and (29), and study how changes in search frictions
affect the equilibrium level of employment, unemployment and participation. Moreover, using
the same example, we examine the ability of the model to match gross worker flows, since an
advantage of our model is that it identifies individual labor market transitions (in contrast to
the Merz, 1995, large family model). Finally, we look at dynamics away from the steady state
equilibrium by changing the job finding rate to mimic a typical recession and characterise
the transition back to the steady state.
4.1 Search frictions and aggregate participation
The steady state of (28) and (29) is presented in Appendix B. In particular, the steady state
labor market allocations are determined by the cost of participation, ξ, and parameters
describing the labor market frictions, (λ, f ), the Ins and Outs of unemployment. Following
Krusell et al. (2010), we analyse how a reduction in the job-finding rate affects steady state
labor market outcomes.
We establish the following Proposition:
Proposition 3 A fall in the job finding rate f has the following impact on steady state labor
market outcomes:
1. lowers aggregate employment, N ;
2. raises the unemployment rate, u;
3. has an ambiguous effect on the labor force participation, Π.
The proof of Proposition 3 is in Appendix B.
The reduction in the job finding rate lowers aggregate employment through the increase in
the labor wedge, which from (30) implies that the MRS must fall (since the real wage is
pinned down by technology and preferences, and is not affected by search frictions in steady
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state). Thus, consumption must fall, requiring a lower level of capital and employment.
The unemployment rate must increase since the steady state unemployment rate is determined
only by the balancing between the inflow rate into unemployment and the outflow rate. As
the inflow rate is constant, determined by the destruction rate λ, a reduction in the outflow
rate, determined by f , must raise the unemployment rate in steady state.
The ambiguous effect on aggregate participation lead us to the following proposition.
Proposition 4 There exists a threshold level of ξ, denoted ξ̂, such that at ξ > ξ̂ an increase
in the finding rate, f , raises participation, and at ξ < ξ̂ an increase in f lowers participation.
At ξ = ξˆ, participation is acyclical. The threshold level is equal to
ξ̂ = −

λ ln
(
1 − h
)
1 − λ
 . (31)
The proof of Proposition 4 is in the Appendix B.
A (permanent) change in the finding rate, f , affects the aggregate level of participation via
three channels. The first channel is through returns to market work via the “effective” real
wage rate, w f (the substitution effect). The second channel is through the opportunity cost
of employment, the left hand side of the intratemporal condition in (28), so that increases in
the finding rate increase the opportunity cost, which, in turn, discourages participation in the
labor market. The net substitution effect, taking into account the opportunity cost channel,
affects labor supply decisions via the labor wedge in expression (30). The third channel is
the income effect from a permanent change in the finding rate, which affects the budget set
of the stand-in agent through the effective real wage.
At ξ = ξ̂, the net substitution and income effects cancel out and aggregate participation is
acyclical; while at ξ > ξ̂, the net substitution dominates and participation is procyclical, and
at ξ < ξ̂, the income effect dominates and participation is countercyclical.
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It follows from Proposition 4 that the model can deliver both a countercyclical or a procyclical
participation rate, depending on the elasticity of the labor wedge to changes in f , controlled by
the parameter ξ, the opportunity cost of participation. Thus, the neoclassical growth model
with search frictions can be reconciled with a mildly procyclical participation rate. In turn,
this result is particularly important given the tendency for models featuring intertemporal
substitution in frictional labor markets to deliver excessively procyclical participation and,
thus, procyclical unemployment (a problem stressed by Ravn, 2008; Shimer, 2013, for
example).
4.2 Gross worker flows
Unlike the Merz (1995) large family set-up which only identifies net worker flows, our model
yields equilibrium outcomes for gross worker flows. To illustrate this point, we present a
simple quantitative exercise to evaluate the model’s ability to explain the average gross flows
in the data. In particular, despite its parsimony the model is able to account well for the
transitions between unemployment and inactivity, which previous literature has shown to be
challenging.
The model yields gross flows across the three states of employment, unemployment, and
non-participation, resulting from individual optimal behaviour, given by
φee,t = (1 − λt ) + pit (ed)λt f t, φue,t = pit (u) f t, φoe,t = pit (o) f t,
φeu,t = pit (ed)λt
(
1 − f t ) , φuu,t = pit (u) (1 − f t ) , φou,t = pit (o) (1 − f t ) ,
φeo,t = λt (1 − pit (ed)), φuo,t = 1 − pit (u), φoo,t = 1 − pit (o),
(32)
with φss′,t the transition rate from state s to state s′, for s, s′ ∈ {e, u, o}, in period t, implied
by the labor market parameters, f and λ and the randomisation induced by the optimal
choices for the lotteries over labor force participation. The latter may induce in equilibrium
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Table 1: Gross worker flows (model and data)
to s′:
φs,s′ e u o
from s:
e 0.977 (0.972) 0.017 (0.014) 0.006 (0.014)
u 0.229 (0.228) 0.637 (0.637) 0.134 (0.135)
o 0.010 (0.022) 0.027 (0.021) 0.963 (0.957)
calibrated values
λ 0.0290
f 0.2645
pi(o) 0.0373
pi(ed) 0.7848
pi(u) 0.8660
Notes: In the first panel, values outside brackets are obtained from
the model and the values in brackets are the empirical counterpart,
obtained from Krusell et al. (2017), and used as targets. The lower
panel reports the calibrated value for each parameter.
different participation probabilities chosen by the individuals starting in employment but
who lose their jobs, those unemployment and those out of the labor force, in turn, pit (ed),
pit (u) and pit (o). We argue bellow that this feature is important for the success of the model
to match the gross worker flows across the unemployment and non-participation states.
In the sequel we focus on steady state transition probabilities. For the US, we measure
gross worker flows empirically from the longitudinal monthly Current Population Survey
(CPS), as explained for example in Elsby et al. (2015) and Krusell et al. (2017). We test the
model’s ability to explain labor market transitions with a simple calibration experiment. We
select values for the parameters determining labor market transitions, [λ, f , pi (o) , pi (ed) ], to
minimise a distance criterion function of the deviations of the gross transitions from their
empirical counterparts, given the equilibrium conditions (29), and for an employment rate
set to N = 65%.
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Table 1 compares the gross flows implied by the calibrated example economy to their empirical
counterparts (as reported in Krusell et al., 2017, based on the CPS longitudinal micro data),
and reports the implied calibrated values for the vector vector of parameters. Despite the
parsimonious set of parameters to match nine targets, the model does a relatively good job at
matching gross flows, comparable to the results in Krusell et al. (2017), who develop a richer
incomplete market model with heterogeneous agents. The model is particularly successful at
matching the high transition rate from unemployment to inactivity, φuo, which the literature
has found challenging.6
Key to the success of the model to match the transition from unemployment to inactivity is
the indeterminacy in the composition of the stock of job searchers, H. This indeterminacy is
resolved by the sunspot mechanism which yields different participation probabilities chosen
by the individuals starting in employment but who lose their jobs, those unemployment and
those out of the labor force, in turn, pit (ed), pit (u) and pit (o). From equation (32) we see that
φuo = 1− pit (u), the transition rate from unemployment to inactivity is entirely determined by
pit (u). Thus, it is possible to construct a sunspot equilibrium from (15) and (16), to match
successfully the φuo transition rate.
5 Conclusion
This paper shows that the same aggregation as in Andolfatto (1996) can be obtained without
either lotteries or additional exogenous randomization (the game of musical chairs), when
individual choices over contingent commodities are coordinated by sunspots. We show that
this aggregation approach offers a tractable method to construct a general equilibrium model
6Garibaldi and Wasmer (2005), in a model with linear utility, and Krusell et al. (2011), in a model
with concave utility and incomplete markets, both show that the transition rates from unemployment to
inactivity are difficult to account for in three-state equilibrium models of the labor market, without additional
heterogeneity across individuals to achieve the calibration target. Garibaldi and Wasmer (2005) experiment
with permanent heterogeneity across workers, while Krusell et al. (2011) consider transitory productivity
shocks to match the transition from unemployment to inactivity.
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of gross worker flows. The upshot is that the economy with sunspots yields testable predictions
about gross workers flows, which may be confronted with micro level data on labor market
transitions.
Turning to future work, the fact that an equilibrium with musical chairs can be decentralized
with sunspots, opens the possibility to study adverse selection and moral hazard in labor
markets with search frictions, using results for sunspot equilibra in incentive constrained
economies (Kehoe et al., 2002).
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Appendix
A Lottery equilibrium
Proposition 5 An equilibrium with musical chairs and lotteries is characterised by pit (˜ı) ∈
(0, 1), for ı˜ ∈ {ed, u, o}, and pit (end) = 1.
Proof. Let us argue by contradiction. Suppose pit (end) ∈ [0, 1) and pit (˜ı) ∈ [0, 1]. Then,
pit (end) ∈ [0, 1) requires (10) to modify as follows:
ξ − ln
(
1 − h
)
≥ wthUc (ct ) (A.1)
Multiplying both sides of (A.1) by f t , yields
ξ − f t ln
(
1 − h
)
> f tξ − f t ln
(
1 − h
)
≥ f twthUc (ct ) , (A.2)
which in turn, requires pit (˜ı) = 0, for ı˜ ∈ {ed, u, o}. Subsequently, the employment law of
motion in (25) requires H = 0 and imposing the steady state restriction, it follows that
pi(end) = 1/ (1 − λ) > 1, which is a contradiction.
B Steady state and comparative statics
In this Section we compute the steady state allocation and the comparative statics for the
example economy presented in Section 4.
The steady state of the first block, system (28), after imposing steady state, reduces to
y
k
=
(
1/β − 1 + δ
α
)
(B.1)
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n
k
=
(
1/β − 1 + δ
α
)1/(1−α)
, (B.2)
c
k
=
(
1/β − 1 + δ
α
)
− δ (B.3)
n =
f
ξ − f ln
(
1 − h
) 1 − α
1 − δ (k/y) . (B.4)
In turn, the steady state of the second block yields
H =
λ
ξ − f ln
(
1 − h
) 1 − α
1 − δ (k/y) 1h, (B.5)
Π =
(
λ
f
+ 1 − λ
)
n
h
, (B.6)
O = 1 − Π, (B.7)
U = Π − n
h
, (B.8)
u =
λ(1 − f )
λ + f (1 − λ) . (B.9)
It follows from (B.4), (B.6), (B.9) that the elasticity of employment, unemployment rate and
participation, respectively, with respect to f is equal to
N, f =
ξ
ξ − f ln
(
1 − h
) > 0, (B.10)
u, f = − 1
1 − λ + λ/ f
1
1 − f < 0, (B.11)
Π, f =
ξ
ξ − f ln
(
1 − h
) − λ/ f
λ/ f + 1 − λ, (B.12)
where X,Y ≡ (dX/dY ) (Y/X ) denotes the elasticity of X with respect to Y . The result below
follows directly from (B.12).
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Corollary 1 There exist ξ̂ such that Π, f = 0. For ξ > ξ̂ it follows that Π, f > 0 whereas for
ξ < ξ̂ it follows that Π, f < 0. The threshold level is equal to
ξ̂ = −

λ ln
(
1 − h
)
1 − λ
 . (B.13)
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